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Abstract  
Why do IT project managers control their projects? As stated in the majority of existing literature on 
information systems, it is because project participants are self-interested parties with goal incongru-
ence and information asymmetry between them. Accordingly, the relationship between controller and 
controlee has been generally described as similar to the one that exists between principal and agent 
under agency theory. Consequently, control activities have predominantly been seen as efforts to min-
imize related agency problems. The only exception so far is the study of Remus and his colleagues 
(2015), who found that control may also address coordination requirements. However, it remained 
unclear whether further control intentions exist. This paper introduces alternative theoretical view-
points in addition to the agency and coordination aspects of control that may explain further control 
purposes in IS projects. The research thus contributes to literature by providing a broader view on 
control intentions in IS projects. Findings can benefit IS professionals by enabling them to consciously 
think about the purpose of control and hence to choose control mechanisms more effectively. 
Keywords: Control, IS Project, Agency Theory, Control Purpose 
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1 Introduction 
Carrying out information systems (IS) projects on time, on the right quality and within budget often 
causes difficulties due to their non-routine, complex, dynamic and temporary nature (Mahring and 
Keil, 2008). Managers use control mechanisms, such as regular status meetings and defined project 
milestones, because control can help ensure projects remain within the projected time and budget and 
delivered on the expected quality (Heumann et al., 2015). In IS project control literature control is de-
fined as an attempt to align individual behaviours with organizational objective (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal, 2003; Kirsch, 1996, 1997; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). In line with this definition, an underly-
ing assumption in the area of IS is that the purpose of control mechanisms is to diminish the agency 
problem (Remus et al., 2015). The agency problem is a core concept of agency theory and it refers to a 
conflict between the interests of principals and those of agents: the self-interest of agents can lead to 
the appropriation of value from the organization. Appropriation can take many forms including ad-
verse selection, performance problems and moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
However, the assumption that the goal of control mechanisms is only to tackle agency problems seems 
to oversimplify the matter and outside the area of IS a broader view has already been employed (e.g. 
Dekker, 2004; Gulati and Singh, 1998). This was also the starting point of Remus and his colleagues 
(2015) who found that control mechanisms are in place because of the coordination needs of complex 
IS projects, in addition to dealing with agency concerns. The authors also created the concept of “con-
trol purpose” that is defined as the intentions underlying the controller’s choice and implementation of 
specific controls (Remus et al., 2015). Nevertheless this research has limitations: it only examined the 
presence of appropriation- and coordination oriented controls and that it did so by employing a sec-
ondary case study analysis approach, where the control purpose could not always be determined. For 
example the authors found that a specific stakeholder meeting was established but the reasons for this 
were not mentioned in their data sources.  
The central thesis of this ongoing research is that multiple control purposes exist and that diversified 
theoretical lenses would provide improved accuracy of explaining them. Each theory has its own indi-
vidual limitations (Langley, 1999) and Cram, Brohman and Gallupe (2016) also point out that, e.g., 
employee wellbeing (labour process theory) can contradict to the owner’s objective of profitability 
(agency theory). This paper introduces two candidate theories that may explain further control inten-
tions, while maintaining that further fitting theories may exist. Accountability theory claims that if in-
dividuals need to justify their beliefs and actions to another individual or organization, they attach the 
sense of accountability to these. This yields a number of advantages, for instance increased prosocial 
behaviour (Vance et al., 2015) and so an intention behind control could be to increase the sense of ac-
countability. Although this theory shares some assumptions with agency theory – e.g. both emphasize 
the importance of monitoring subordinates - one core difference between the two theories is that while 
agency theory depicts agents as self-interested utility maximizers without any signs of conscience or 
consideration about social norms, accountability theory highlights the importance of actors’ self-image 
and their need for social approval (Bovens, 2010). Psychological ownership theory suggests that indi-
viduals can feel a sense of ownership of a project, in respect of which they have control, self-
investment and intimate knowledge, and can become a part of their sense of self (Pierce et al., 2001). 
Psychological ownership is often linked to positive outcomes, such as citizenship and stewardship be-
haviour (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2008; O’driscoll et al., 2006) and hence one purpose of control 
may be to maximize the development of psychological ownership among controlees. The use of this 
theory was also suggested by Remus et al (2015). 
Beyond broadening the theoretical lens on control intentions a study in this area is important because 
Cram (2011) has found that the exaggeration of appropriation oriented controls can result in negative 
socio-emotional side effects of controlees and that they ignore the crucial goal of company value crea-
tion (Rai and Tang, 2014). Furthermore, appropriation-oriented controls can become counterproduc-
tive as they can diminish feelings of autonomy and responsibility and can negatively affect the satis-
faction and performance of controlees (Donaldson, 2008). 
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The proposed main research questions of this ongoing research therefore are: (i) What are the inten-
tions behind control in IS projects from the perspective of project managers/controllers? (ii) Which of 
these intentions cannot be explained with agency theory? (iii) How do controlees perceive these inten-
tions? On the basis of a grounded theory study focusing on IS development projects, this work con-
tributes to IS project management research and practice by (1) providing broad insights on motivation-
al and situational factors of control mechanisms through control intentions, and by (2) drawing IS pro-
ject managers attention to ensure that the chosen control mechanisms are appropriate for their specific 
control purposes and that controlees have the same understanding on them. 
2  Theoretical background  
2.1  Organizational control and IS project control 
Organizational control is an important managerial function that has been the target of a broad range of 
research in the field of management and organization studies. One reason for this is that organizations 
often face the problem of self-interested employees who may not consider collective goals (Cardinal et 
al., 2017). Fayol (1949) named control as one of the four key managerial functions, next to organizing, 
planning and coordinating. “Control corresponds to mechanisms that managers use to direct atten-
tion, motivate, and encourage individuals to act in ways that support the organization’s objectives” 
(Long et al., 2002). This definition highlights three main features of control that differentiate it from 
other managerial activities. First, it is manager-centric, peer-  and bottom-up oriented control are 
somewhat neglected among management scholars (Long et al., 2011). Second, control is goal oriented, 
it is created to reach a well-defined aim. Third, it is multi-faceted: it consists of a broad collection of 
practices that can be categorized for example as clan, bureaucratic and market control (Ouchi, 1979), 
belief, boundary, diagnostic and interactive control (Simons, 1995) but other categorizations also exist 
(Sitkin et al., 2010).  
In the area of IS projects, control is seen mainly from a behavioural perspective: it is an attempt to 
align individual behaviours with organizational objectives (Heumann et al., 2015). The majority of IS 
projects consists of hierarchical layers (Wiener et al., 2017) and so control is regarded a dyadic rela-
tionship between a controller and a controlee; controllers are typically managers and controlees are 
members of their teams. Controllers are individuals who choose and implement control in order to 
regulate the behaviour of controlees. They can select specific actions called control mechanisms that 
help to achieve organizational goals by defining who will do what and when and how. A control port-
folio consists of a variety of control mechanisms (Wiener et al., 2016). These can be categorized into 
different control modes that represent a unique collection of actors and techniques to achieve control. 
Control modes can be formal or informal. Formal controls are input, behavioural and outcome con-
trols, and they are used to enforce previously defined plans and emphasize accountability and measur-
ability. Informal controls are clan and self-control and they are used to create shared values and norms 
(Cram et al., 2016).  
2.2  Agency, stewardship and coordination theories 
As per the original agency concept, one party – the principal – employs another party – the agent – 
because the principal believes this relationship will result in higher value creation than working alone. 
The theory assumes that both the agent and the principal are self-interested utility maximizers (Wright 
et al., 2001). The agency problem has two facets: (1) the principal and the agent have different inter-
ests and (2) there is an information asymmetry between parties. Self-interests differ in two main ways: 
(1) principals want agents to work hard, but agents would like to minimize their efforts; and (2) prin-
cipals want agents to assume some of the risks for the outcome of their work but agents do not want to 
assume any risks (Bosse and Phillips, 2016). 
Due to these problems there is a likelihood that the agent doesn’t act in the best interests of principals 
and thus the principals cannot create as much value as they had expected to. The challenge is to create 
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maximum value while minimizing the costs related to the collaboration, called agency costs. Agency 
costs range from the costs of undiminished agency problem to the costs of minimizing agency prob-
lems (Bosse and Phillips, 2016). A prominent scholar who criticized the theory is Michael Granovetter 
(1992) who states that the theory is under socialized, meaning it does not reflect the social and psycho-
logical complexities of human actors. On this line of thought Davis and his colleagues suggest replac-
ing agency theory with one called stewardship theory that has more generous assumptions about hu-
man motivations (Davis et al., 1997). 
Stewardship theory challenges most of the core assumptions of agency theory. Most strikingly it 
moves away from the individualistic self-interested economic actors of agency theory to a collective 
serving, trustworthy, self-actualizing human being, whose interests are aligned with those of the prin-
cipal and who thus coordinates with the principal (Davis et al., 1997). Accordingly there is no need to 
align interests and to monitor agents, even though information asymmetry exists between parties, due 
to the nature of work. Therefore, agents work hard without any extrinsic incentives and in the best in-
terests of the organization. Stewardship theory can be complemented with coordination theory. This is 
useful because the former explains the need for coordination from a motivational-situational perspec-
tive, while the latter describes coordination from a processual perspective (Crowston, 1997). Accord-
ing to coordination theory, employees face different coordination problems due to the complexity of 
tasks and the dependencies that constrain how these tasks can be performed. Coordination is defined 
as managing dependencies between activities. To address these coordination problems, employees 
must perform additional activities called coordination mechanisms (Remus et al., 2015). 
2.3 Accountability 
Another concept that can be considered as a response to agency theory is accountability that is defined 
as “the implicit or explicit pressure to justify one’s beliefs and actions to others” (Tadmor and Tetlock, 
2009). It has recently reached popularity in IS literature because it has the potential usefulness to deter 
antisocial behaviour of internal employees. An example of such behaviour is access policy violation, 
when insiders access information contrary to the policies about how access rights can be used in the 
organization (Vance et al., 2015). Accountability theory describes how the need to justify a person’s 
behaviours to another party causes that person to feel accountable for the process by which decisions 
and judgments were reached. According to the theory, the need to account for a decision process or 
outcome makes it more probable that a person will think deeply and systematically about his or her 
procedural behaviours. In turn, people who think deeply and systematically about a process are more 
likely to consider the consequences of their behaviour and thus will perceive higher accountability for 
their actions. Such decision making that involves a sense of accountability for processes and outcomes 
has a number of advantages: it increases prosocial behaviour, conformity to expected behaviours and 
decreases risk taking (Tadmor and Tetlock, 2009; Vance et al., 2015). 
The theory proposes four key mechanisms that increase the sense of accountability. First, identifiabil-
ity, that is a belief that one’s work outputs could be linked to the same person. Second, expectation of 
evaluation that is the belief that one’s performance will be assessed by another party according to 
some normative ground rules and with some implied consequences. Third, awareness of monitoring, 
that is a user’s state of active cognition that his/her system-related work is monitored. Fourth, social 
presence, that is the awareness of other users in the system also increases the development of the sense 
of accountability (Tadmor and Tetlock, 2009; Vance et al., 2015). Accountability theory can be com-
pared and contrasted to agency theory, because certain assumptions of the two theories overlap. Simi-
larities and dissimilarities are summarized in Table 1 (based on Bovens, 2010, Vance et al, 2015, 
Bosse and Philips, 2016). 
 
 Agency theory Accountability theory 
Main objective Explains how principals can work effi-
ciently together with agents, despite the 
agency problem. 
Explains how to reduce antisocial behav-
iours or increase prosocial behaviours. 
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 Agency theory Accountability theory 
Approach  Methodological individualism Methodological collectivism 
Actors  Principal (individual or organi-
zation) 
 Agent (individual or organiza-
tion) 
 Actor (individual or organization) 
 Accountability forum (individual, 
or organization).  
Source of account 
giving 
 Principal-agent relationship  Principal-agent relationship 
 Professional accountability (e.g. 
chambers) 
 Legal accountability (e.g. court) 
Assumptions of 
account giving 
 Agent is obliged to inform the 
principal about his or her conduct 
 Principle can interrogate the 
agent and can question the adequacy of 
the information 
 Principal may pass judgement 
on the conduct of the agent 
 Agent may face sanctions 
 Actor is obliged to inform the ac-
countability forum about his or her conduct 
 Accountability forum can interro-
gate the actor and can question the adequacy 
of the information 
 Accountability forum may pass 
judgement on the conduct of the actor 
 Actor may face sanctions 
Components  External: Controlling, monitor-
ing by principal 
 External: social approval, embod-
ied by the accountability forum 
 Internal: Self-image preservation 
Operationalization Controlling, monitoring with the purpose 
of aligning the agent’s interest to that of 
the organization 
Controlling, monitoring with the purpose of 
evaluation. Can also be used to encourage 
and award employee performance (Hall et 
al., 2003). 
Table 1  Comparison of agency theory and accountability theory 
2.4  Psychological ownership 
Psychological Ownership (PO) can be defined as a state in which individuals feel that the target of 
ownership is theirs; it is the feeling of possessiveness and being tied to the target of the possession. 
This results in the feeling that “what is mine, becomes a part of me” and the target becomes part of the 
psychological owner’s identity (Pierce et al., 2001). Extant literature posits three main reasons as to 
why psychological ownership exists. The first motive underlying possession is to be in control. The 
second root of ownership is self-identity: people can use ownership to define themselves and express 
their identity to others (Dittmar, 1992). Finally, ownership comes from the need to possess a space or 
territory, because “When we inhabit something, it is no longer an object for us, but becomes part of 
us”. Ownership creates an opportunity to satisfy this need (Pierce et al., 2001).  
There are three major mechanisms through which PO develops. First, control exercised over a physical 
or non-physical target gives rise to feelings of ownership over that object (Csikszentmihalyi, M., 
Rochberg-Halton, 1981). Second, association with the target of possession also helps forming owner-
ship. The more intimately a person knows an organizational factor, the more likely that ownership will 
develop in respect of that factor. Third, work in and of itself can lead to psychological ownership. 
Through labour workers invest energy into products and services they create. These become represen-
tations of the self, just like words, thoughts and emotions (Pierce et al., 2001). 
Psychological ownership produces different effects on the attitudes and behaviours of individuals 
(Dawkins et al., 2017). PO leads to higher organizational commitment (Han et al., 2010), higher job 
satisfaction, organization-based self-esteem (Liu et al., 2012), work engagement and intention to stay 
(Zhu et al., 2013). It is positively linked to citizenship behaviour, that is a person's voluntary commit-
ment within an organization that is not part of his or her contractual tasks (VandeWalle et al., 1995). 
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Henssen et al. (2014) found that PO is also positively related to the stewardship behaviour of organiza-
tional leaders, that is the sense of personal responsibility in followers for the long-term wellbeing of 
the organization and society. Negative consequences of PO include territorial behaviour to protect and 
maintain the targets of PO. People exhibiting such behaviour tend to have anger and act defensively 
when, for example, a meeting room that was booked by them is taken by someone else (Brown et al., 
2014). Moreover PO can lead to an unwillingness to accept advice, resistance to change and feelings 
of personal loss (Liu et al., 2012).  
3 Conceptual framework  
The basic theoretical concept of the research is that in addition to appropriation concerns, other prob-
lems and needs can be addressed through control in IS projects. With the help of the theories described 
above, the research is going to expand the “control purpose” concept the following way.  
First, traces of appropriation oriented control will be searched, that is defined as controls targeted at 
the controllers’ anticipated concern about their organization’s ability to capture adequate value from 
the IS project (Remus et al., 2015). The underlying agency theory has three main assumptions: (1) 
agent and principal are self-interested utility maximizers, (2) there is goal incongruence between par-
ties and (3) there is information asymmetry between parties (Eisenhardt, 1989). This kind of control 
addresses appropriation concerns and the controller’s goal is to minimize agency problems. Second, 
the presence of coordination oriented control will be examined, that is defined as controls targeted at 
the anticipated complexity of the IS project and the difficulties associated with managing resource and 
task interdependencies (Remus et al., 2015). The underlying stewardship and coordination theories 
assume that (1) individuals are collective serving and trustworthy and (2) that coordination is required 
due to information asymmetry. This type of control addresses coordination requirements with the goal 
to maximize value creation.  
Third, the existence of accountability oriented control will be investigated, that is defined as controls 
targeted at creating the sense of accountability. The underlying accountability theory presumes that 
people seek to preserve self-image and social approval and that the sense of accountability increases 
compliant behaviour. This type of control addresses the need to have compliant individuals in the or-
ganization and the goal of this control is to ensure this compliant behaviour. Fourth, the research will 
look for the signs of psychological ownership oriented control that is defined as controls targeted at 
facilitating the formation of psychological ownership. This type of control is based on psychological 
ownership theory according to which there is a psychological connection between the individual and 
the target of ownership. Here the addressed problem is organizational commitment, job satisfaction, 
work engagement and the controller’s goal is to maximize psychological ownership. 
The conceptual framework will be used first by exploring whether controllers encounter the problems 
these theories address. If yes, the research will investigate how controllers seek to address these issues 
and the ideal outcomes of these efforts are. The study will also consider whether controlees agree if 
these problems exist and if they have the same understandings of the employed control mechanism.  
 





oriented control  
Psychological owner-
ship -  oriented control 
Definition Controls targeted at 
the controller’s antic-
ipated concern about 
her organization’s 
ability to capture 
adequate value from 
the IS project (Remus 
et al, 2015) 
Controls targeted at 
the anticipated com-
plexity of the IS pro-
ject and the difficul-
ties associated with 
managing resource 
and task interdepend-
encies (Remus et al, 
2015) 
Controls targeted 
at creating the 
sense of account-
ability 
Controls targeted at 
facilitating the for-
mation  of psychologi-
cal ownership 
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Table 2  Conceptual framework 
4 Methods  
Given the scarcity of theories in prior research on IS control purposes, the main goal of this research is 
theory development. For inductive theory building there are a number of methods available, such as 
interpretive case study, ethnography and grounded theory. The latter has been chosen that gained pop-
ularity not only in the broader IS research (Matavire and Brown, 2013), but also in the area of IS pro-
ject control (Gregory et al., 2013). While this choice may be surprising first due to the consideration of 
a priori theories and a literature review, grounded theory fits the purposes of this research because of 
the following reasons. 
First, this research implements a less strict version of grounded theory from Sarker, Lau and Sahay 
(2001), that has already been used in IS context by e.g. Mueller, Mendling and Bernroider (2018). 
This adapted grounded theory approach introduces an alternative to the paradigm model of the 
Straussian grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and argues for the usage of meta-theoretical 
frameworks in the selective coding phase to provide a guiding lens for researchers. This is in line with 
McGhee et al (2007) who argue that a priori literature review (1) provides a context and justification 
for the study, (2) provides a basis for demonstrating the appropriateness of a grounded theory ap-
proach, and (3) satisfies institutional or other such requirements for a literature review to precede data 
collection and analysis. Other sources also claim that launching into data collection without first look-
ing at the literature is a misconception of grounded theory (Urquhart and Fernández, 2013); Boudreau 
and Robey (2005) assert that prior knowledge of theory, literature, personal and professional experi-
ences guide researchers’ data analysis. Using an adapted version of grounded theory is in accordance 
with Matavire and Brown (2013) who argue that grounded theory can be flexibly be implemented and 
that its approaches have been employed in a broad variety of ways in IS literature.  
Second, grounded theory combines the strengths of both the interpretivist and the positivist world 
(Charmaz, 2006). Orlikowski (1993) characterises grounded theory as interpretive because (1) it uses 
qualitative and unstructured data that represent the subjective understanding of actual members of the 
study and (2) it involves subjective sampling and analysis techniques. Nevertheless grounded theory 
also benefits from the strengths of the positivist world, because (1) it provides a systematic coding 
procedure (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) and because (2) especially at the selective coding phase, it re-
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quires a deductive verification of inductive findings that is compatible with the logic of positivism 
(Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992). 
Data collection will start with interviewing IS project managers and participants using the intensive 
interviewing concept (Charmaz, 2006). The interview protocol will contain questions related to project 
description, employed control mechanisms and possible reasons of their presence. The data collection 
will take place in the IT departments of multinational companies including both internal and out-
sourced contexts and agile and traditional development approaches. Data analysis will rely on the 
adapted version of grounded theory, consisting of open, axial and selective coding followed by theo-
retical integration (Sarker et al., 2001; Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 1998).  
5 Next steps, expected results, contributions 
The research will continue with an exploratory case study focusing on a single organization. This will 
be followed by an examination that compares multiple organizations and seeks to find factors that in-
fluence control intentions. With reference to the research questions, the study is expected to show that 
(1) there are different intentions behind control in IS projects and that (2) some of these intentions 
cannot be explained with agency theory. Furthermore, it is also anticipated that different controller 
intentions are perceived differently by controlees. Therefore, this research may explain the work of 
Remus et al (2015) in terms of the presence of coordination-oriented control. This study seeks to con-
tribute to the area of IS, first by expanding and validating the “control purpose” concept (Remus et al., 
2015) through the application of new theoretical lenses. Second, the research investigates the possible 
theoretical links between the concepts of accountability, psychological ownership and IS project con-
trol by examining whether seeking for compliant behaviour of subordinates and the formation of PO 
are intentions behind control. These contributions may help IS project managers to adjust their control 
portfolio and guide them to use the right control mechanisms under different circumstances. 
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